The recent release of the United States’ National Security Strategy (NSS) has prompted a flurry of discussion, incorrectly framing the document as America’s abandonment of Europe. This perspective misses the fundamental reality: the strategy is not a call for desertion, but a formal codification of the transactional nature and increased expectation of burden sharing that has been articulated by President Trump and the American electorate for years. For policymakers and academic realists, this shift underscores the enduring influence of neoclassical realism, where the domestic attitudes of American voters—whose dissatisfaction has grown alongside surging military spending (from an average of $294 billion USD in 2000 to $916 billion USD in 2023)—are the primary drivers of foreign policy and alliance behaviour. This re-emphasis on direct security threats in the Indo-Pacific and Latin America is the culmination of a decades-long process, a movement reflecting a 2018 Pew poll where only 30 per cent of young Americans believed the US should remain the world’s security leader.
This official shift in priorities should be a wake-up call, not a shock, for Europe, necessitating a proactive response to guarantee continued American support. The path forward is exemplified by frontline states like Estonia and Japan, which have successfully navigated the complexities of their security relationship with Washington by becoming undeniable assets. Estonia, a small nation strategically located on Russia’s border, has transcended its dependent status to become a net security provider to NATO, focusing its resources on a unique niche: providing critical cybersecurity expertise and troop deployments for missions outside the European theatre, such as aiding the French in Africa. This proactive approach led Estonia to voluntarily increase its defence spending to 3.2 per cent of GDP even before the new administration returned to the White House, serving as a model ally within the alliance structure.
Similarly, Japan has re-energised the US–Japanese alliance through decisive action and demonstrable commitment. Following Prime Minister Takaichi’s announcement to accelerate the defence spending increase from 1.8 per cent to 2 per cent of GDP by March of the coming year—rather than over the course of years—American enthusiasm for the partnership surged, with US Embassy staff in Tokyo referring to Japan as America’s greatest ally. Japan further cemented its strategic value by strengthening alliances with other nations within the US-led framework, notably Australia and Indonesia, a move highly valued in Washington as it focuses on the Indo-Pacific.
To thrive under America’s new transactional policies, the nations of Europe must follow a three-pronged strategy rooted in strategic specialization and investment. First, each alliance member must identify its niche—a unique security facet, such as AI or cybersecurity, that offers value to the US beyond the European theatre, mirroring Estonia’s specialisation. Second, Europe should actively invest in the US defence industry and its re-industrialization effort, a key security goal of President Trump, fostering mutual investment and recalling how American industrial capacity supported the Allies in World War II. Third, and most crucially, European nations should not merely meet the new demands, but exceed them; if the US calls for a 5 per cent of GDP collective defence spending target, they should aim for 5.5 or 6 per cent. Just as Estonia’s proactive contributions were rewarded with regular patrols by French and American fighter jets, going above and beyond on burden sharing will ensure America remains committed to its European partners, leading a coalition of the willing and able, as it did during the Cold War.
